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Resumo: As questões principais deste trabalho são: quais obrigações os ricos globais 
têm para com os muito pobres, considerando-se que a ordem institucional global é 
injusta? Há deveres para institucionalizar os direitos humanos sob tais circunstâncias 
institucionais não ideais? Quão fortes são estes deveres? Minha tese é que aquilo que 
torna deveres fortes ou fracos não é que eles sejam deveres positivos ou negativos, 
no sentido derivado da teoria da ação. Ao invés disto, a força de deveres individuais 
depende da sua referência a bens básicos e a sua especificação, o que depende em 
parte dos arranjos institucionais existentes, na medida em que envolvam viabilidade, 
determinidade, custo e eficiência.
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The main question of this paper are: Which duties towards the very poor 
have the global rich given that the global institutional order is unjust? Are there 
duties to institutionalize human rights? How strong are these duties?
First, I will make some remarks about individual duties and the problem 
of their strength. I will defend the idea that reference to basic goods on the one 
hand and specification on the other determine the strength of a duty. If this is 
true, then duties corresponding to social human rights are strong only if there 
are adequate institutions in place.
Secondly, I will consider the idea that under ideal institutional circumstances 
the problem of world poverty would be solved by securing human rights. 
Non-ideal institutional circumstances are either circumstances of imperfect 
compliance with just institutions, or circumstances in which institutions are not 
in place, or circumstances under which human rights remain unfulfilled because 
of institutional failure. Here the most important question is how we can come 
from non-ideal institutional conditions to ideal institutional conditions. I will 
examine the revolutionary utopian strategy as well as the strategy of small steps 
introduced by Karl Popper and recently worked out by Amartya Sen.
Thirdly I will introduce two recent proposals concerning individual 
duties towards the very poor from Thomas Pogge and Elizabeth Ashford. 
While Pogge claims that we are contributing to and profiting from an unjust 
world order that causes poverty and have therefore compensating obligations 
of help and reform, Ashford claims that we have duties to create institutions 
that would solve the problem of world poverty. Both of them claim that these 
duties are strong and correspond to human rights. With regard to the question 
of a duty’s strength, I will argue that it depends on two different factors: firstly, 
the importance of the good that is protected by a corresponding right, and 
secondly, the action’s or omission’s degree of determinateness as required by 
the duty. If this is right, then the duties referred to by Pogge and Ashford are 
not strong since they are underdetermined under given circumstances.
The last part of the paper will introduce feasibility, efficiency, costliness, 
and accountability for previous behaviour as additional criteria determining 
the strength of duties. The intention is to draw a more complex picture of what 
we consider as strong individual duties. What we will see is that the strength 
of individual duties partly depends on existing institutional arrangements as 
far as concerning feasibility, determinateness, costliness, and efficiency. Then 
again, the question is how institutional improvement is achievable. Here, it 
seems that people who push institutional improvement often do more than 
their duty on the one hand, or do not fulfill compliance duties with imperfect 
institutions on the other.   C. Mieth – Global injustice, individual duties and ...  49
Some remarks about duties
What is the problem with duties? In the recent debate about world 
poverty many authors especially point out that there is a problem with positive 
duties (Caney, Gilabert, Pauer-Studer, Pogge etc.). They seem less strong than 
negative duties, less determinate, have no corresponding rights and so on.1 
Duties as such require that we restrict our options about what to do – and this 
is true for positive as well as negative duties. If positive duties require actions 
and negative duties require omissions, both restrict our behavioural choices. 
If I have the duty to save a child drowning in a shallow pond, I do not have 
the option to buy an ice-cream instead. If one accepts this as a starting point, 
the question becomes what constitutes legitimate restrictions of our options. 
Here, the first factor most plausibly seems to come from the theory of goods. 
If it makes sense to presuppose that all of us share basic needs, basic interests, 
transcendental interests, or rational interests concerning basic goods, it seems 
sensible to declare their protection a matter of rights and duties. The deal, as 
many have pointed out, is then that I have a right to life (not to be murdered or 
seriously injured) if I grant all others that right and this means that I accept the 
corresponding duty not to murder or seriously injure them (Gewirth, 1987).
Now, there has been a long discussion about the assumed asymmetry 
between positive and negative rights. The classical liberal conviction would be 
that negative rights are the only ones that can be legitimized. The underlying 
idea is that corresponding duties lead to a restriction of liberty that should be 
kept as tight as possible. The ideal of liberalism would then be, as Kant has once 
formulated it, that under just circumstances everybody would have what they 
deserve and that would be enough for everyone.2 If there would not be enough 
for everyone, this would not be due to injustice but to unlucky circumstances, 
to natural disasters, illnesses and so on. Under such circumstances, if someone 
was injured due to instances beyond human influence, what would still be   
 
1  For a discussion of positive and negative duties see Pogge (2002; 2006), Gilabert (2005), 
Mieth (2008; 2011).
2  “Es  ist  in  der  gantzen Welt  nichts  so  heilig  als  das  Recht  anderer  Menschen,  dieses  ist 
unantastbar, unverletzbar. […] Wenn wir uns einen Menschen vorstellen, der nur nach Recht 
und nicht nach Gütigkeit handelt, so kann dieser Mensch sein Hertz immer vor jeden Menschen 
verschliessen, er kann gleichgültig seyn gegen sein elendes und jämmerliches Schicksal, 
wenn er aber nur gewissenhaft ist in Beobachtung der Pflichten gegen jedermann, wenn er nur 
jedes Menschen sein Recht, das der Regirer der Welt den Menschen gegeben hat, hält; wenn 
er keinem Menschen nicht das Geringst umsonst giebt, aber auch darin pünktlich ist, daß er 
ihm nichts entzieht; so handelt er recht, und wenn alle so handeln möchten, wenn alle keine 
Handlungen der Gütigkeit und der Liebe ausüben möchten, aber das Recht jedes Menschen 
unverletzt liessen, dann wäre kein Elend in der Welt, als nur ein solches Elend, was nicht aus 
der Verletzung des Rechts Anderer Fließt zE Krankheit, Unglücksfälle. Das größte und mehrste 50  Civitas, Porto Alegre, v. 12, n. 1, p. 47-69, jan.-abr. 2012
relevant were duties of humanity or benevolence. However, humanity or 
benevolence would not be a compensation for suffered injustices. In other 
words, if there still were basic goods missing under ideal circumstances of 
full compliance with negative duties, this would not be a question of justice. 
But, if we consider the question of rights and duties from the idea that the most 
important thing are the substances of the rights that should be protected, the 
borderline between positive and negative rights begins to shift.
One question is what should be protected, and the next question is how 
it should be protected. The first question leads us to a theory of basic goods or 
basic interests. As lots of defenders of positive rights have pointed out, well-
being and subsistence are as important as security and freedom to lead a human 
life (cf. Shue, Gewirth, Pogge). The answer to the second question is more 
difficult. Henry Shue (2005) has pointed out that it is not rights but duties that 
are positive and negative. Both, security and subsistence lead to corresponding 
duties to avoid the violation of the substance of the right, as well as to duties 
to protect the substance of the rights, and at last to duties to help those who 
are deprived of the substance of the right. Now, what belongs to the realm of 
justice? Avoiding the destruction of already present subsistence? Providing for 
subsistence if anybody lacks the means to care for her own subsistence in the 
first place? These cases differ with respect to the notion of duties that one is 
willing to defend. Libertarians want to avoid as many restrictions of liberty as 
possible. The idea is that I am solely responsible for my own actions because 
that is what I can control. So, according to the libertarian view, it is forbidden 
to push a toddler into a shallow pond but not so concerning saving him if he 
drops in by himself.3
  Elend der Menschen beruht mehr auf der Ungerechtigkeit der Menschen als auf dem Unglük. 
Da aber die Achtung des Rechts eine Folge der Grundsätze ist, die Menschen aber einen Mangel 
an Grundsätzen haben, so hat die Vorsicht einen andern Quell in uns gelegt, nämlich den Instinct 
der Gütigkeit, wodurch wir das ersetzen, was wir auf eine unrechtmässsige Art erlangt haben. 
Wir haben demnach einen Instinct zur Gütigkeit aber nicht zur Gerechtigkeit. Nach diesem 
Triebe erbarmen sich Menschen über andere und erzeigen Wohlthaten dem sie es vorhero 
entrisssen, Obgleich sie sich keiner Ungerechtigkeit bewust sind, das kommt daher, weil sie es 
nicht recht untersuchen. Man kann mit Antheil haben an der allgemeinen Ungerechtigkeit, wenn 
man auch keinem nach den bürgerlichen Gesetzen und Einrichtungen Unrecht thut. Wenn man 
nun einem Elenden eine Wohlthat erzeigt, so hat man ihm nichts umsonst gegeben, sondern man 
hat ihm das gegeben, was man ihm durch eine allgemeine Ungerechtigkeit hat entziehen helfen. 
Denn wenn keiner die Güter des Lebens nicht möchte mehr an sich ziehen wie der andere, so 
wären keine Reiche aber auch keine Armen, demnach sind selbst die Handlungen der Gütigkeit, 
Handlungen der Pflicht und Schuldigkeit, die aus dem Recht anderer entspringen.” (Immanuel 
Kant, Vorlesung über Moralphilosophie, p. 282s, cf. Horn, 2007).
3  What is interesting concerning this example is that the English Common Law, Australia and 
most states of the US do not treat failure to render assistance in an emergency as a punishable 
deed whereas most European countries do.   C. Mieth – Global injustice, individual duties and ...  51
Many have attacked this view based on the insight that we consider 
it as a severe moral wrong not to help if an important good (the life of the 
child) is at stake that can be provided for easily. The point is that by accepting 
strong positive duties, what we have to do does not only depend on us and 
our previous actions but also on the world and the neediness of other people. 
Although I have not made any mistake, I must help other persons in need. 
While the minimalist libertarian view rejects the idea that we are responsible 
for evils that we have not caused ourselves, the maximalist utilitarian view 
holds that we should do anything we can to prevent evil from others. I think 
that both extreme views are mistaken. On the one hand, we know that there 
are strong positive duties, e. g. from parents towards their children. Now, 
the libertarian would accept this and say that such a duty comes from the 
parents’ previous behaviour (begetting the child). Here we clearly see that the 
problem of the strength of a duty does not lie in its being positive or negative, 
understood as requiring an action or an omission. Positive duties, understood 
as duties that require a certain action, are not as such less determined or more 
costly than negative duties, understood as duties that require omission. So, 
what makes duties strong or weak is not that they are positive or negative in 
the sense derived from the theory of action.
We have to put the libertarian view into question, is when it claims that 
there is no strong duty to save an important good for someone to whom one 
has no previous relationship to. Against the libertarian point of view, I want to 
defend the idea that positive duties that do not go back to previous behaviour 
and, instead, refer to basic goods can nevertheless be strong. Against the 
maximalist utilitarian position, I defend the view that not from all threats to 
basic goods strong duties for anyone follow. J.O. Urmson (1958) has once 
formulated the insight that fulfilling a duty must lie within the capacity of 
ordinary men. If a duty is strong or basic, we mean that we could criticize 
someone who does not fulfill it for having made a serious mistake. And this is 
obviously not the case if each and every one of us had the strong duty to provide 
everyone else with basic goods. Either this does not lie within the capacity of 
ordinary men and women in the sense that it is not possible or it is infeasible 
to fulfill the duty – hence, there would be no duty since ought implies can4 – or 
to do our part, which might mean to do all we can in order to provide others 
with basic goods, might be too costly and therefore an illegitimate expectation. 
I will come back to this point in section four again. Moreover, and this will 
be my point in this section, what we should do in order to fulfill such a duty   
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might be too unspecified to identify a concrete duty-violation. On the one hand 
basic goods are the most important thing to be protected by imposing duties 
on others, but on the other hand it is not always clear what they have to do in 
order to protect basic goods of others. And if this is not clear it makes a big 
difference for the strength of the duty.
I suggest a reconstruction of the strength of duties according to two 
criteria. The first criterion is the significance of the good that is protected by the 
ensuing duty. This leads to a differentiation of the strength of duties according 
to the theory of goods that diverges from the differentiation of negative and 
positive duties according to the theory of action. Such a differentiation is very 
plausible in scenarios like Singer‘s drowning child case since it provides an 
explanation for the fact that most people would say that there is a strong duty 
to save someone from drowning if one can do this at almost no cost for oneself. 
The drowning-child scenario is analogous to the world poverty problem with 
respect to the goods involved on the side of the needy. The child’s life is at 
stake and so is the life of the poor who might die from poverty-related diseases 
or hunger. But the two cases differ with respect to another morally relevant 
factor: in the drowning child case the positive duty to help is clearly specified 
while it is underdetermined in the poverty case. Furthermore, whereas the 
case of the drowning child refers to an unforeseeable individual problem, 
poverty refers to an institutional problem to secure social human rights. But 
without adequate institutions in place, duties corresponding to individual 
social rights remain underdetermined. I defend the idea that the strength of 
duties can depend on their specification so that specification can be considered 
as a second criterion concerning the strength of duties. From this we get the 
following picture: strong duties are duties which refer to basic goods and are 
specified; they include both negative and positive duties. However, there are 
specified duties not referring to basic goods (e.g. keeping promises), and these 
duties are weaker than those referring to basic goods. In case of conflict, the 
significance of the goods involved determines the priority of the duty. On the 
other hand, there are duties that refer to basic goods but are underdetermined. 
They seem to be weaker than duties that are determined but refer to minor 
goods (it seems that helping the poor today is not an excuse for breaking a 
promise).
If it is true that the strength of duties depends on their specification, 
different institutional arrangements would influence the strength of duties. As 
a German citizen, I have the duty to comply with the German social system by 
paying taxes. Since this duty is referring to basic goods and, at the same time, 
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are secured in this way this seems to be a human-rights-corresponding duty. 
Now the interesting question is the following one: what duties do individuals 
have if no institution is in place that could guarantee the protection of human 
rights? Here it seems plausible, as for example James Griffin (2009) proposes, 
to differentiate between primary duties that have the same content as human 
rights and secondary duties to promote human rights. But the problem we 
are left with in respect of social rights is that we do not even know what our 
primary duties would be without considering adequate social arrangements 
first.  Therefore, I will take a look at ideal institutional circumstances in the 
next section.
Ideal and non-ideal institutional circumstances
What is relevant for our question about individual duties under non-ideal 
institutional circumstances is the following: what would individual duties be 
under ideal institutional circumstances? Where would this lead with respect 
to the protection of the substances of rights?
Libertarian institutions would secure that no individual kills, injures 
or steals from another. Under full compliance there might still be injuries 
or problems with subsistence that would result from natural circumstances 
instead of injustice. The same is true for the case that some individuals violate 
their duties but that the institution forces them to compensate for the damage 
they have inflicted on others.
If we directly measure the justice of a society with respect to the fulfillment 
of rights (the providence for their substances) accounting for to the goods 
available, we get quite a different picture. Alan Gewirth (1987) propounds 
that as long as someone is lacking basic goods and there are others that have 
more than enough they should transfer those goods and the needy person has 
a right to the goods in question. A society, then, is just if all goods at hand are 
distributed with respect to the fulfillment of negative and positive rights. The 
case that despite all duties being fulfilled, the substances of some rights still 
weren’t provided could occur only if there was nothing left to redistribute.
On the other hand, a state of affairs where an adequate standard of living 
is realized might also be called ideal, but it need not be just since it could be 
combined with injustice understood as the lack of full compliance with just 
institutions.
There are two parameters of idealization: as far as the question of how 
people act is concerned, the matter is full compliance; as far as the question 
of state of affairs is concerned, the issue is whether people’s endowment with 
basic goods is sufficient.54  Civitas, Porto Alegre, v. 12, n. 1, p. 47-69, jan.-abr. 2012
The problem with the first parameter is that our question was how 
we could come to ideal institutional circumstances from a non-ideal world. 
The duty that leads us there cannot itself be a compliance duty. Maybe ideal 
scenarios provide an answer for the question: what would be an ideal scenario, 
given that all people would comply with the laws of the imagined society and 
given that further circumstances were good?—The question about what would 
be just given full compliance and good natural circumstances does not lead 
to an answer concerning our problem of individual duties under non-ideal 
institutional circumstances.
With regard to the question how to get from unjust circumstances to 
just institutional arrangements, Karl Popper has distinguished two methods: 
Utopianism and piecemeal engineering. He describes the Utopian approach 
as follows:
Any rational action must have a certain aim. It is rational in the 
same degree as it pursues its aim consciously and consistently, and 
as it determines its means according to this end. To choose the end 
is therefore the first thing we have to do if we wish to act rationally; 
and we must be careful to determine our real or ultimate ends, from 
which we must distinguish clearly those intermediate or partial ends 
which actually are only means, or steps on the way, to the ultimate 
end. If we neglect this distinction, then we must also neglect to ask 
whether these partial ends are likely to promote the ultimate end, and 
accordingly, we must fail to act rationally. These principles, applied 
to the realm of political activity, demand that we must determine our 
ultimate political aim, or the Ideal State, before taking any practical 
action. Only when this ultimate aim is determined, in rough outline 
at least, only when we are in possession of something like a blueprint 
of the society at which we aim, only then can we begin to consider 
the best ways and means for its realization, and to draw up a plan 
for practical action. These are the necessary preliminaries of any 
practical political move that can be called rational, and especially 
of social engineering (Popper, 2003, p. 166s).
The two main problems of this approach are that the focus on the 
ideal either prohibits that anything at all is done if the circumstances are not 
favourable or that some revolutionary act is violently executed, and by doing 
so, more justice is paid for with unjust appliance of force and, therefore, with 
moral costs being too high. As opposed to utopianism, Popper proposes the 
method of piecemeal engineering, which starts with concrete solutions for 
concrete problems without planning a revolution of the whole system. It is 
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models, that is taken as the starting point but concrete injustices most people 
agree should be abolished.5
I wish to outline another approach to social engineering, namely, 
that of piecemeal engineering. It is an approach which I think to 
be methodologically sound. The politician who adopts this method 
may or may not have a blueprint of society on his mind, he may or 
may not hope that mankind will one day realize an ideal state, and 
achieve happiness and perfection on earth. But he will be aware that 
perfection, if at all attainable, is far distant, and that every generation 
of men, and therefore also the living, have a claim; perhaps not so 
much a claim to be made happy, for there are no institutional means 
of making a man happy, but a claim not to be made unhappy, where 
it can be avoided. They have a claim to be given all possible help, 
if they suffer. The piecemeal engineer will, accordingly, adopt the 
method of searching for, and fighting against, the greatest and more 
urgent evils of society, rather than searching for, and fighting for, 
its greatest ultimate good. This difference is far from being merely 
verbal. In fact, it is most important. It is the difference between a 
reasonable method of improving the lot of man, and a method which, 
if really tried, may easily lead to an intolerable increase in human 
suffering. It is the difference between a method which can be applied 
at any moment, and a method whose advocacy may easily become 
a means of continually postponing action until a later date, when 
conditions are more favourable. And it is also the difference between 
the only method of improving matters which has so far been really 
successful, at any time, and in any place (Russia included, as will 
be seen), and a method which, wherever it has been tried, has led 
only to the use of violence in place of reason, and if not to its own 
abandonment, at any rate to that of its original blueprint (Popper, 
2003, p. 168).
Furthermore, Popper claims that the method of small steps is more likely 
to be democratic than utopian engineering:
In favour of his method, the piecemeal engineer can claim that a 
systematic fight against suffering and injustice and war is more 
likely to be supported by the approval and agreement of a great   
 
5  Amartya Sen is defending a comparable model in his recent book The idea of justice: He 
accuses the so called transcendental institutionalists of having no solutions for the problems 
of injustice and reforms under given non-ideal circumstances.  “Perfect global justice through 
an impeccably just set of institutions, even if such a thing could be identified, would certainly 
demand a sovereign global state, and in the absence of such a state, questions of global justice 
appear to the transcendentalists to be unaddressable” (Sen, 2009, p. 25). The alternative, so called 
realization-focused comparison would aim at the abolition of manifest injustices. His question 
is: “What international reforms do we need to make the world a bit less unjust?” (ibid.).56  Civitas, Porto Alegre, v. 12, n. 1, p. 47-69, jan.-abr. 2012
number of people than the fight for the establishment of some ideal. 
The existence of social evils, that is to say, of social conditions 
under which many men are suffering, can be comparatively well 
established. Those who suffer can judge for themselves, and the 
others can hardly deny that they would not like to change places. 
[…] But if it is easier to reach a reasonable agreement about existing 
evils and the means of combating them than it is about an ideal good 
and the means of its realization, then there is also more hope that 
by using the piecemeal method we may get over the very greatest 
practical difficulty of all reasonable political reform, namely, the use 
of reason, instead of passion and violence, in executing the program. 
There will be a possibility of reaching a reasonable compromise and 
therefore of achieving the improvement by democratic methods. 
[…] As opposed to that, the Utopian attempt to realize an ideal 
state, using a blueprint of society as a whole, is one which demands 
a strong centralized rule of a few, and which therefore is likely to 
lead to a dictatorship (Popper, 2003, p. 268s).
Individual duties concerning world poverty:  
Pogge and Ashford
As we have seen in the first section, a very straightforward answer to 
the question what duties we have towards the poor could be that if they have 
a human right to food and health services, everybody who could provide for 
these goods has a strong and direct duty to do so. For example Gewirth holds 
that there are positive human rights-corresponding individual positive duties. 
However, Onora O’Neill objects on the basis that this would be inefficient. If 
those rights need to be institutionally secured, there must be an institutional 
duty-allocation system. Hence, there are no individual positive duties directly 
corresponding to positive human rights (as Griffin implies in his thesis that 
there  are  primary  duties  and  secondary  duties  to  improve  human  rights 
development). Following Onora O’Neill, it seems that there are solely duties 
corresponding to social human rights if adequate institutions are in place 
first. Individual duties make no sense in this context since ought implies can: 
“Individuals cannot be obliged to resolve the problems of world hunger, or 
to grow wings and fly”. (O’Neill
, 
2005, p. 251) But even if this were true, 
individuals might still be obliged to diminish poverty because they have the 
capability to lessen some of the suffering of the poor (as opposed to eradicate 
poverty or to “resolve” the problem). The question is, then, how strong this 
duty is. Here the classical Kantian answer would be that duties to diminish 
poverty are weak individual duties of benevolence. My point in section I has 
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like the duty to render assistance in an emergency such as Singer’s drowning 
child case can be strong. The duty to diminish poverty is weak because it is 
underdetermined. There are some duties that refer to basic goods but remain 
underdetermined and are therefore weak.
Alternatively to duties corresponding directly individual human rights, 
many theorists have proposed that individuals have the duty to establish 
institutions that will protect social rights and allocate duties efficiently (Orend, 
2002, p. 145; Ashford, 2006). They see O’Neills point that without institutional 
allocation of duties the problem of world poverty cannot be solved. Their 
point is, then, that there is an individual duty to create adequate institutions 
instead of or in addition to an individual duty to lessen the suffering of the 
poor directly. Elizabeth Ashford has recently pointed out the fact that both 
negative and positive rights confront us with an allocation problem concerning 
corresponding positive duties to protect. Ashford shows that “institutional 
structures are just as important in specifying and allocating many of the 
negative duties imposed by rights as the positive duties, so that the need for 
an institutional allocation of the corresponding duties does not distinguish 
positive rights to aid from negative rights not to be harmed” (Ashford, 2006, 
p. 221).
This is a point similar to the one we know from Henry Shue: Institutions 
must protect positive and negative rights via allocation of duties to avoid, 
to  protect  (e.g.  of  policemen)  and  to  aid.  In Ashford’s  picture  not  the 
existence of welfare rights is dependent on adequate institutional structures 
(like Onora O’Neill 1996 claims), rather the securing of the substance of 
welfare rights requires just global institutions. Therefore, under given non-
ideal circumstances, individual social human-rights-corresponding duties 
have the content of creating institutions that would secure these rights. If 
such institutions are not in place, or given institutions are unjust, individuals 
have a duty to institutionalization. Not the existence but the fulfillment of 
human rights is dependent on institutionalization. At first sight this seems very 
plausible.
But how exactly is a single individual able to fulfill this duty? What 
actions are required? Is electing the right party enough? What if the aim to 
establish just global institutions is not part of the program of any political party 
one could vote for? What is then required: the foundation of a new political 
party? Civil disobedience? Donations to NGOs? How much engagement can 
reasonably be expected? If we take a closer look at the duty to institutionalize 
human rights directed at an average individual, it is threatened by the problems 
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in the first section, the duty to institutionalize social human rights seems 
underdetermined in most cases: there are no clear options between which to 
decide. But if this is the case, no one can blame us for having acted in this or 
that concrete way or for not having done this or that.
Thomas  Pogge’s  important  proposal  is  that  we  must  shift  from  an 
interactional understanding of human rights to an institutional one. He calls 
the  interactional  understanding  “maximalist”  and  as  such  threatened  by 
overdemandingness: “a human right to X gives you a moral claim against 
all others that they each do whatever is in their power to ensure that you 
have X” (Pogge, 2005, p. 64). It seems quite obvious that we can count Alan 
Gewirth as someone who has an interactional understanding of human rights.   
At first sight it looks as if Pogge would present us a more minimalistic and less 
demanding understanding of duties. He calls his own conception an institutional 
understanding of human rights as opposed to an interactional one.
But then he deduces individual human rights-corresponding (negative) 
duties from the institutional understanding “according to which a human right 
to X gives you a moral claim against all others that they not harm you by 
cooperating, without compensating protection and reform efforts, in imposing 
upon you an institutional order under which you lack secure access to X as part 
of a foreseeable and avoidable human rights deficit” (Pogge, 2005, p. 67).
This means that their human rights-standard is the criterion for the 
legitimacy of institutions. For individual duties this leads to a restriction in 
range and subject matter: Pogge claims that we only have to care for the 
human rights of those we share an institutional scheme with. What institutional 
scheme do we share with the very poor? Pogge’s idea is that we, the citizens 
of the rich and mighty western democracies, are contributing to and profiting 
from the world order that shapes the expectations for the very poor in an unjust 
way. Therefore, we have harmed the poor and, hence, must make compensating 
efforts of protection and reform. At this point, there is a double relevance of 
democracy with regard to the origin and contend of our duties.
Democracy means that political power is authorized and controlled 
by the people over whom it is exercised, and this in such a way as 
to give these persons roughly equal political influence. Democracy 
involves voting – on political issues or on candidates for political 
offices – in accordance with the general idea of one-person-one-vote 
(Pogge, 2002, p. 146).
So, democracy is a means to human rights-fulfillment and is itself 
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Duties to institutionalize human rights are also duties to democratization of 
authoritarian regimes. The opportunity of democratic participation is followed 
by the responsibility for the decisions that are met by the government. This 
is especially important as far as the citizens of western democracies are 
concerned since their governments shape the unjust global order in their name. 
Pogge writes:
We are asked to be concerned about avoidably unfulfilled human 
rights not simply insofar as they exist at all, but only insofar as they 
are produced by coercive social institutions in whose imposition 
we  are  involved.  [...] The  existing  global  institutional  order  is 
neither natural nor God-given, but shaped and upheld by the more 
powerful governments and by other actors they control (such as 
EU, NATO, UN, WTO, OECD, World Bank, and IMF). At least 
the more privileged and influential citizens of the more powerful 
and  approximately  democratic  countries  bear  the  a  collective 
responsibility for their governments’ role in designing and imposing 
this global order  (Pogge, 2002, p. 172s).
Let us go a little more into detail about the institutional understanding. 
It entails the ideal that „human rights violations, to count as such, must be in 
some sense official, and [...] human rights thus protect persons only against 
violations from certain sources. Human rights can be violated by governments, 
certainly, and by government agencies and officials, by the general staff of an 
army at war, and probably also by the leaders of a guerrilla movement or of a 
large corporation – but not by a petty criminal or by a violent husband. We can 
capture this idea by conceiving it to be implicit in the concept of human rights 
that human-rights-postulates are addressed, in the first instance at least, to 
those who occupy positions of authority within a society (or other comparable 
social system)” (Pogge 2002, 57f.). But, and this is important for us here, 
within democracies, the accountability of human rights violations to officials 
goes back to those in whose name they act: “the language of human rights 
demands involves a demand for protection not only against official violations 
but, more broadly, against official disrespect, and it addresses this demand 
not only to officials, those whose violations of a relevant right would count 
as human-rights-violations, but also to those in whose name such officials are 
acting” (Pogge 2002, 58). In this sense, the accountability of human rights 
violations to individuals presupposes democratic structures.
A commitment to human rights involves one in recognizing that 
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in moral conversation and practice have certain basic needs and 
that these needs give rise to weighty moral demands. The object 
of each of these basic human needs is the object of a human right. 
Recognizing these basic needs as giving rise to human rights involves 
a commitment to oppose official disrespect of these needs on the part 
of one’s own society (and other comparable social systems in which 
one is a participant) (Pogge, 2002, p. 58).
Here we are confronted with several degrees of institutional failure 
concerning human rights protection. Official disrespect of human rights goes 
back to governments and their agents and agencies. The idea is that this is the 
worst case since these are the actors that were especially required to protect 
these rights. So, they commit serious wrongs if they fail to secure human 
rights or even actively violate them. “Such wrongs do not merely deprive their 
victims of the objects of their rights but attack those very rights themselves; 
they do not merely subvert what is right, but the very idea of right and justice” 
(Pogge, 2002, p. 59).
All in all we can find three Versions of official disrespect of human 
rights:6
–  A Government does not order or authorize human rights violations and 
efficiently prevents them with respect to its own agencies and officials, 
but reserves the legal power to order violations itself.
–  A Government is legally bound not to violate human rights but does 
nothing  to  ensure  that  its  agencies  and  officials  do  abide  by  the 
prohibition.7
–  A Government is legally bound not to violate human rights and ensures 
that its agencies and officials do abide by the prohibition but fails to 
make violations illegal for other persons and associations under its 
jurisdiction (Officially tolerated private violence).
Now, depending upon how much influence our governments have on the 
global level in shaping the global order, they are violating human rights by 
not shaping a different, more human rights-friendly global order, and if our 
governments are democratic, we are responsible for their actions, which means 
that we are violating human rights, too.
6  “Governments may do so by issuing or maintaining unjust laws or orders that authorize or 
require human-rights violations or they may do so ‘under color of law’, that is, by perversely 
construing existing legislation as licensing human-rights violating policies” (Pogge, 2002, p. 59).
7  “Moral wrongs committed by an official fit the better under the label of ‘human-rights violation’ 
the more closely they are related to his job and the more tolerated or encouraged they are 
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The structure of the argument is as follows: The global order is responsible 
for local human-rights-unfulfillment. There are feasible alternatives to the 
present global order under which more human rights could be fulfilled (e.g. 
by institutional reform, by legally prohibiting the resource and borrowing 
privileges). The global order is unjust since these available options are not 
realized. The order is shaped by governments (and other actors). If we have 
democratically elected our government, we are also responsible for the unjust 
global order and its human-rights-violating consequences. Since we have a 
strong negative duty not to harm others by not contributing to injustice without 
compensating efforts of help and reform, we are violating human rights if we 
do not make these compensating efforts.
Still, it seems a little unfair to come to the conclusion that the average 
citizen of a western democracy is violating human rights of others since he has 
voted for, say, Angela Merkel. What alternatives would she have had? Would a 
vote for the SPD have brought a bigger advance for human rights development 
worldwide? This does not seem too plausible. At least the way we are involved 
in an unjust order is very far from the common forms of being, to a legally 
criticisable degree, involved into injustice. Let us have a brief look at two 
forms of criticisable forms of injustice:
Committing an injustice: This means directly harming another person. 
He is a means for my profiting from injustice (e.g. in German Law § 253 
StGB: extortion, § 240 StGB: indecent assault, § 242 StGB: theft, § 251 StGB: 
holdup murder, § 211 StGB: homicide) or the injustice is an end in itself (cf. 
self-administered justice, sex-murder) or the injustice is a result of a violation 
of another duty  (§ 229 StGB: bodily injury caused by negligence, p.e. through 
driving under alcohol). Those infringements of the law require criminal 
prosecution. Furthermore they give rise to compensation, p.e. compensations 
for pain and suffering.)
Contributing  to  injustice:  Here  the  contribution  to  the  violation  is 
indirect. This is the case if one does not press charges against someone 
planning a crime (cf. § 138 StGB: Nicht-Anzeigen geplanter Straftaten; cf. 
§ 258 StGB: Strafvereitelung) or in the case of handling stolen goods (§ 259 
StGB). Those forms of contributing to injustice often go along with profiting 
from the injustice. Either they are themselves relevant to criminal law or they 
give rise to claims of restitutive justice.
However, one cannot say that the average citizens of rich and influential 
western democracies are committing injustice or contributing to it to such 
an extensive degree as just described (for the point that our contribution to 
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be necessary to demonstrate that we have strong duties to compensate for the 
injustices we have committed.
Where Pogge’s institutional understanding of human rights seemed 
more minimalistic and less demanding than the individual one, it turns out to 
be as problematic as individual compensating duties that follow from it are 
concerned. These duties are as underdetermined as the duties that would directly 
follow from a conception of human-rights-corresponding positive duties either 
to provide others with basic goods or duties to establish institutions that would 
secure a duty allocation that would lead to an adequate providence with basic 
goods. If there is no clear metric concerning the amount of duty violation 
and the adequate amount of compensation, there is no advantage concerning 
demandingness as well. On the one hand, one could say that our contribution is 
so small that we have almost no compensation to make. Then this duty will not 
be very demanding but neither will it be very helpful. Contrariwise, the duty 
of compensation might be be very demanding since the world is very unjust, 
but it is not clear how we can avoid being involved in unjust structures. Since 
we would be back to problems of feasibility and efficiency discussed earlier, 
there would be no advantage compared to the maximalist understanding of 
human rights. Pogge’s trump that we have strong duties only to compensate 
for evils we committed and not to help others where we did nothing wrong in 
the first place gets lost under non-ideal institutional circumstances that make 
it impossible to account individual contributions to an unjust world order.
Let us now reconsider Ashford’s individual duties to institutionalize 
human rights. They refer to basic goods that are protected by human rights 
but they are underdetermined. Hence, if my account in section I is convincing, 
they are weak because of their indeterminateness. This makes them resemble 
classical duties of benevolence. But the concept of benevolence is misleading 
at this point. It comprises, for example in the Kantian picture, all duties that 
refer to the aim to further the well-being of others. This picture is misleading 
since there is a clear difference between the strength of the duty to improve 
Peter’s well-being by inviting him for dinner (non-necessary good) and the 
duty to save a drowning child (necessary good). But if a duty that refers to a 
basic good is unspecified, it is still weak although it refers to a basic good.
There are three reactions to this diagnosis that we can take into account. 
First, one can deny that duties of institutionalization are underdetermined; 
second, one can deny that determinateness plays a role concerning the strength 
of these duties – I will reject these strategies in the last part of the paper (section 
four) –third, we can accept the analysis. The question is, then, whether we can 
gain something by shifting from duties to responsibilities. Maybe the notion    C. Mieth – Global injustice, individual duties and ...  63
of responsibility is more adequate to describe the phenomenon concerning the 
weakness of human-rights-corresponding duties under non-ideal circumstances 
than the notion of duty. If we shift from duties to responsibilities (as it is 
common in the current debate), this might have the advantage that we can shift 
from a moral concept to a strategic one. Even if duties of institutionalization 
are underdetermined in general, it may be possible to assign responsibilities 
to improve human rights-standards according to certain criteria. Instead of 
claiming abstract duties, the task consists in showing which responsibilities 
can be assigned to us according to our range of action. These responsibilities 
will be specific and may be considered as duties according to their degree 
of specification. Under non-ideal institutional circumstances, on a pragmatic 
level, the strength of duties depends on specific possible assignations of 
responsibilities. For the individual, this requires her to critically review her 
specific range of action and determine which actions or omissions lead to 
human rights improvement or deterioration.
The diagnosis of injustice and the relevance of  
feasible alternatives
If we do consider world poverty as a problem of injustice, this implies that 
someone is responsible for it. We can then also hope that the same entity that 
is responsible for its occurrence or persistence is responsible for its removal 
and able to do so. In order to understand the problems and implications of the 
positions just discussed better, let us differentiate between the following cases 
that differ with respect to feasibility, understood as the possibility of actors to 
change a bad situation.
Scenario A: There exists no injustice, but unfortunate natural 
circumstances.
Imagine ten people a hundred years ago standing around an eleventh 
person who is dying from angina, that he caught during the cold winter. None 
of them has the means to save him (since antibiotics have not been discovered 
yet). We would not say that any one of them committed an injustice by not 
saving him though having tried the best they could.
To save the man is infeasible in the sense that it was impossible to save 
him since the only means to save him were principally out of reach.
Scenario B: Injustice or lack of humanity?
Imagine ten persons standing around the eleventh man with angina in 
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B1:  None of them has access to antibiotics, nor money to buy some. The 
situation would be comparable to A: it is infeasible for the others to save the 
person.
B2:  One of them, a pharmacologist, has the antibiotics. However, the man 
with angina has no money, and the pharmacologist refuses to give him the 
pharmaceutics for free. The laws of the society in question protect property 
rights and forbid stealing the medication. The other nine could steal the 
medication and save the man. Now, while it is feasible for all of them to save 
the man, the question is whether they have a duty to do so.
B3:  The Society could establish public health insurance, into which all eleven 
persons would have to pay money. The insurance, then, would pay for the 
antibiotics of the ill person, while all of them would then have the duty to 
comply with public health laws of the society. Whether this alternative is 
feasible seems to depend on further factors, for example whether there are 
institutions that could efficiently enforce this system?
What the scenarios should have demonstrated is the following. First, if it 
is impossible to save someone, there is no duty to do so. That is the well-known 
“ought implies can”. There is no guilt, no injustice, and no moral problem, if it 
was beyond human reach to change the situation for the better: there simply was 
no alternative option. Infeasibility in a strict sense denies the existence of a duty. 
Second, even if it were possible, which means feasible in the sense that there is 
an alternative option (to give the medication for free/to steal the medication), 
this does not directly lead to the conclusion that there is an individual duty 
to do so regardless of the circumstances. In this case, other morally relevant 
factors play a role as well, especially demandingness (Can we expect the 
pharmacologist to give the medication for free? Can we expect the man who 
steals the medication to accept severe punishment for stealing?). Third, since 
the second situation is already normatively determined (stealing is forbidden, 
giving medication to the poor is not somehow institutionally arranged), the 
question is whether we need an alternative institutional arrangement under 
which there would be no conflict between anti-stealing laws and individual 
duties to save lives. If such an arrangement is infeasible, the question reoccurs 
whether we face an injustice or just unlucky circumstances. If the arrangement, 
on the other hand, is feasible, the question reoccurs whether the alternative 
is justifiable: Are the duties that would be imposed under it too demanding? 
Would the introduction of the new arrangement via enforcement lead to other 
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Let us now, for the sake of the argument, assume that a) from B1 does not 
follow a duty to save the man since this would be overburdening under given 
institutional circumstances (actions to save the man might be supererogatory 
or legally excusable but not required), and b) there is a feasible institutional 
alternative, but this alternative is not in place. What does follow for the duties 
of the ten men?  As we have seen, Ashford’s answer is that they have a duty 
to institutionalize the adequate health care system. Let us now ask again: is 
this feasible?
B4:  The situation harks back to B2, but now B3, as an option, is known by all 
eleven men. Now, how can they institutionalize the health care system? B4.1: 
There is a political party that has B3 on the agenda. In this case, do they have 
a duty to vote for that party? (Let us, for the sake of the argument, assume that 
there are only two parties with only two programs: pro and con public health 
care.) B4.2: There is no political party that has B3 on its agenda. Are we now 
back to B1, or do the men have the duty to found a new party?
What B4 shows us is that existence, strength and content of duties can 
depend on circumstances that we cannot fully control.  Even if we assume 
that there is a party that has the public health care program on its agenda, as 
in B4.1, help for the ill man will come too late. The individual problem and 
the structural problem differ. The man in question cannot be saved by the 
fulfillment of the duty to bring better institutions into place. In our example, it 
may seem right to vote for the party that has health care on its agenda, but this 
is for the sake of fulfilling the duty to support (or establish) just institutions, 
not for the sake of saving the man. One might say that the case of the man 
shows us that we need better institutions, and that we wouldn’t have realized 
why this is important without this experience. But even so, this still would not 
help that man. The duty to vote for the health insurance party would follow 
directly from a duty to act politically responsible whether or not one had 
contact to the ill man. On the other hand, if there were no possibility to create 
better institutions in this respect, or to at least contribute to doing so, as in 
B4.2, there seems to be no duty to do so, as is the case in A and in B1. And 
this case is comparable to the average western citizen’s options with respect 
to the world-poverty-problem.
Still, under the premise that there is no global health care system in 
place, let us go back to B2 and the question whether the pharmacologist 
should give the medication for free or the other men should steal it. Under 
non-ideal institutional circumstances, the action of the pharmacologist would 
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and his act would also be supererogatory if he would do more than other 
pharmacologists in a similar situation.
From the utilitarian point of view that Peter Unger (1996) has pushed, we 
are allowed to beg, steal and borrow in order to save lives. Nevertheless, under 
the institutional arrangement assumed in B2, the men would face severe costs 
for breaking the law. Now we could consider their stealing the medication 
an act of civil disobedience. Since the institution is unjust compared to the 
feasible alternative B3, they are morally allowed to steal the medication 
although this means breaking the law in the unjust society.  But even if this 
were true, it would not be clear whether by doing this the men would fulfill 
their duty to create better institutions. Some duties do not exist because the 
required action is not feasible (cf. case A). And even if there is a feasible 
action, this might not lead to the success the duty aims at (cf. case B4.1). 
Furthermore, it could be feasible to help the man by stealing but this might be 
too costly for the one who would be punished for this action. Likewise, it is 
not clear whether other actions that would not directly help the man but have 
some political significance, like telling all others that the given institutional 
health care system is unjust, could count as duties to help the man (since it 
might be inefficient) or as duties to institutionalize rights (since it might be 
inefficient, too). It seems that the strength of duties can indeed be assessed 
by the first criterion, the reference to basic goods, and the second criterion, 
specification. If we interpret specification via feasibility, costs, and efficiency, 
we get a more complex picture. There might be options for actions that are 
specified but inefficient or too costly so that it would not be adequate to speak 
of a duty either.
To conclude I would say that our world is not assessable in terms of 
compensating obligations deduced from ideal conception of justice since 
there is too much contingency. Nor is it assessable in terms of duties to   
institutionalize human rights under very unfavourable institutional conditions. 
At least this is so if we employ a notion of a strong duty as it was proposed   
in section I. We could, of course, change this notion and characterize a   
duty as strong based solely on its reference to basic goods, without regard 
for its degree of determinateness. But neither can I see how this fits with 
our considered moral judgements nor does it seem to be in accord with our 
practice. Now of course our question was how we could change the world 
for the better with respect to the institutional improvement of human rights 
standards.
First, it seems clear that under given non-ideal institutional circumstances 
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duties to create these institutions. We could for example say that the costs that 
we would have under ideal conditions are also justified with respect to what 
we could reasonably be expected to do under given non-ideal circumstances. 
(If I would have to pay, say, 100 Euro taxes under a just global institutional 
arrangement, I could be expected to give these 100 Euro to, say, Amnesty 
International, in order to improve institutional human rights enforcement.) As 
the examples above were meant to show, this would still not be some feasible 
act of institutionalizing human rights. We could now say that a contribution to 
human-rights-improvement would be a more precise formulation of the duty in 
question, but then we are back to the problem that this contribution is not very 
specified with regard to what costs it may legitimately entail or with regard to 
what exactly it affords.
Second, these problems, as I take it, arise from the fact that a useful 
notion of a strong duty, like for example Urmson proposed, is created for 
clear interactional and institutional contexts. Institutional changes and social 
movements cannot usefully be described as hark back to people realizing 
what their duties to institutionalize human rights were. It is more probable 
that they realized that some injustices, such as slavery, were intolerable. 
Some of those who were convinced of this fact did more than their duty to 
fight for the abolition of slavery. They risked their lives for their political 
convictions, going way beyond any notion of strong duties described above. 
Even if it was not clear whether the actions that led to the abolition of slavery 
would be successful, people were convinced that they were right. The more 
people join a social movement or give an example of moral courage, the more 
will others realize what their options are and institutional arrangements will 
change.
Third, it seems that, with regard to the two methods compared in section 
II, utopianism is indeed inadequate. At least the examples presented above 
seem to suggest that trying to derive strong individual duties under non-ideal 
circumstances from an idea of ideal social arrangements leads nowhere.   
What about a duty to remove injustice, then? To fulfill this duty would, as 
the examples indicate, also be infeasible. We might have more chances of 
getting somewhere if we instead employ the idea of piecemeal engineering. 
However, Popper develops this method as an experimental one and not as one 
from which clear duties follow. If it is clear that a situation is unjust, it might 
nevertheless not be clear what to do. With respect to the examples above, one 
could, amongst other things, steal the medication, vote for another party, tell 
everyone how unjust the health system is, shout at the pharmacist, write a letter 
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is a strong duty to do any of these things, but on the other hand, these things 
might belong to a process piecemeal engineered social change. Some of them 
might be in vain with respect to what happens to the ill man, but they might 
still have some symbolic political power and change things for the better in 
the future.
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